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Abstract 
 
The aim of our research is to study the association between observed 
leverage and a set of explanatory variables, using panel data analysis to 
establish the determinants of a time varying optimal capital structure from 
new high-tech firms over the period 1998-2002, and to explore whether the 
main theories of firm financing (Trade-Off Theory and Pecking Order 
Theory) can explain the capital structure of these firms. We consider the 
static models, introducing the critical distinction between fixed and random 
effects. 
This is the first time the scope of studying the determinants of the capital 
structure has been extended to new high-tech firms with the use of many 
techniques of panel data.  
Considering the results of the most powerful estimation (WG) as our 
reference, the empirical evidences obtained are stable and similar to those 
documented in the previous empirical researches. 
Confirming the pecking order model but contradicting the trade-off model, 
we find that more profitable firms use less leverage. We also find that large 
companies tend to use more debt than smaller companies, and that firms 
which have high operating risk can lower the volatility of the net profit by 
reducing the level of debt. 
Leverage is also closely related to tangibility of assets and to the ratio of 
non-debt tax shield.  
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1 Introduction 
The basic objective of any corporate finance study of capital structure is to identify 
factors explaining the firm's decision with respect to its financial leverage. Starting with 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), the literature on capital structure has been expanded by 
many theoretical and empirical contributions. Much emphasis has been placed on 
releasing the assumptions made by MM, in particular by taking into account corporate 
taxes (Modigliani and Miller, 1963), personal taxes (Miller, 1977), bankruptcy costs 
(Stiglitz, 1972; Titman, 1984), agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977), 
and informational asymmetries (Myers, 1984). 
1. Two main theories dominate currently the capital structure debate: the 
Trade-Off Theory (TOT) and the Pecking Order Theory (POT). According 
to Stewart C. Myers, the trade-off theory says that firms seek debt levels 
that balance the tax advantages of additional debt against the costs of 
possible financial distress. The pecking order theory says that the firm will 
borrow, rather than issuing equity, when internal cash flow is not 
sufficient to fund capital expenditures. Thus the amount of debt will 
reflect the firm's cumulative need for external funds. 
Consequently, the aim of our research is to study the association between 
observed leverage and a set of explanatory variables, using panel data analysis to 
establish the determinants of a time varying optimal capital structure from new high-tech 
firms over the period 1998-2002, and to explore whether the main theories of firm 
financing (Trade-Off Theory and Pecking Order Theory) can explain the capital structure 
of these firms. We will use annual data from 99 German firms on the Deutsch Boerse. A 
total of 476 observations are available for analysis. 
New high technology firms, for purposes of this research, include firms in many 
sectors such as Biotechnology, Software, Information Technology Services, 
Internet...There was an unprecedented flow of venture capital to these firms over the last 
years. 
The latter sectors are of particular interest because of the nature of their activities. 
On the one hand, high-tech firms are projected to grow faster than non-technology 
companies; they may not be able to rely on cash flow to finance growth because they 
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market overseas twice as often as non-technology firms. On the other hand, the squeeze 
on profit margins may restrict the amount of their cash that can be directed toward 
financing growth. 
So, as the Foreign Minister of Germany remarked, it is often argued that a bank-
based system like Germany suffers from inadequate financing of young and innovative 
firms. But, following the famous Modigliani and Miller theorem (Modigliani-Miller, 
1958), the way a firm is financed does not matter. Thus, high-tech firms could either be 
financed via debt or equity. However, to get the necessary financing, high-tech 
companies turned to nontraditional sources. 
Moreover, these firms often suffer the problems associated with asymmetric 
information, such as adverse selection and moral hazard. In this way, they are affected by 
the typical problems studied in the theory of pecking order. 
Nevertheless, these firms could also set their financial policy by following a target 
indebtedness ratio, as maintained by trade off theory.  
Thus, our focus is on answering three questions: Do corporate financial leverage 
decisions differ significantly for new high-tech firms? Are the factors that affect their 
capital structure similar to those determined for other firms? And finally, are both 
theories, trade-off theory and pecking order theory, enable us to describe the financial 
behavior of new high-tech German firms?  
Regarding methodology, this study attempts to empirically determine the factors 
that affect the optimal debt level by using the panel data analysis. Thus, as a solution to 
problems of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, and for the purpose of comparison we 
will study both Fixed and Random Effects static panel models based on the book value 
measures of leverage. Each kind of model needs different diagnostic tests and different 
estimation techniques in order to achieve efficient and consistent estimators. 
In section 2 we review related theories and practices of capital structure. In 
section 3 we proceed with the description of the determinants of the capital structure. In 
section 4 the process of sample selection is explained and the data is described. Section 5 
covers the model specification and discusses the principal problems of estimating with 
panel data models. Section 6 presents the empirical analyses. Finally, section 7 
concludes. 
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2 Theory and practice of capital structure 
 
2.1 Theories of capital structure 
The last three decades have witnessed large changes in the level and composition of 
capital structure, both among industrial economies and between industrial and developing 
countries. 
Traditionally, the term capital structure has referred to a firm's split between debt 
and equity financing. Thus, a firm choosing an optimal capital structure is interpreted as 
choosing an optimal level of debt. In a dynamic setting, the firm chooses a set of optimal 
debt levels over time. 
Following on the famous irrelevance result of Modigliani and Miler (1958), the 
literature on capital structure has been expanded by many theoretical and empirical 
contributions, which have sought to explain capital structure by introducing many 
frictions. 
Therefore, the capital structure theory can be divided into four categories1: first 
Modigliani and Miller's models with and without taxes, second models that introduce 
financial distress and agency costs, third static trade-off models, and last pecking order 
theory with asymmetric information. 
In the static Trade-Off Model (Myers, 1977), two frictions: the agency costs of 
financial distress and the tax-deductibility of debt finance generate an optimal capital 
structure. An alternative model (Myers and Majluf, 1984) emphasizes frictions due to 
asymmetric information between managers and outside investors. In the Pecking Order 
Model, a financial hierarchy descends from internal funds, to debt, to external equity. 
 
2.2 Related empirical studies 
Over the years numerous studies on capital structure theory have appeared. Modigliani 
and Miller (1958) were the first who theorized the issue by illustrate that the valuation of 
a firm will be independent from its financial structure under certain key assumptions. 
Internal and external funds may be regarded as perfect substitutes in a world where 
                                                 
1
 For an in-depth review of literature on capital structure, see Harris and Raviv (1991). 
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capital markets function perfectly, where there are no transaction or bankruptcy costs and 
the firm cannot increase its value by changing its leverage. 
Five years later, Modigliani and Miller (1963) argue that, due to tax deductibility 
of interest payments, companies may prefer debt to equity. They showed that borrowing 
would only cause the value of the firm to rise by the amount of the capitalized value of 
the tax subsidy. However, Miller (1977) emphasizes the effect of personal taxation. 
Moreover, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that interest tax shields may be 
unimportant to companies with other tax shields, such as depreciation. Based on 
asymmetric information, Meyers and Majluf (1984) predict that companies will prefer 
internal to external capital sources. 
Most empirical researches of capital structure are not recent (Taggart, 1977; 
Marsh, 1982; Jalilvand and Harris, 1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988). Those authors 
made a significant contribution in formulating and testing the determinants of the capital 
structure, but they caution on the difficulty of finding suitable proxies for these 
determinants. 
In their cross-sectional study, Rajan and Zingales (1995) attempt to test for the G7 
countries the extent to which at the level of the individual firm, leverage may be 
explained by four key factors, market to book, size, profitability and tangibility. These 
authors find similar levels of leverage across countries, the determinants of capital 
structure that have been reported for the US are important in other countries as well. 
While financial economists have devoted considerable attention to empirically testing 
theories of optimal capital structure, relatively little research has focused on explaining 
the dynamics of a firm's capital structure. These researches may be classified into two 
groups depending on whether they utilize cross-sectional or time-series data. Fisher, 
Henkel, and Zechner (1989) use cross-sectional data in testing their model of the optimal 
dynamic capital structure and the presence of transactions costs. They attempt to employ 
a dynamic approach to study capital structure to the extent that they study the factors that 
determine the firm's debt ratio range, defined as the difference between its maximum and 
minimum debt ratio. 
The second group of studies of capital structure dynamics utilizes pooled time-
series/cross-sectional data (Taggart, 1977; Marcus, 1983; Jalilvand and Harris, 1984; 
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Sharpe, 1991). In the presence of adjustment costs, firms are assumed to gradually adjust 
their capital ratio at a constant rate so as to eliminate deviations between their optimal (or 
desired) and actual capital ratio. Other recent studies, which have considered capital 
structure dynamics, offer better insight on the adjustment process toward the target debt-
to-equity ratio (Kremp et al, 1999; De Miguel and Pindado, 2001; and Ozkan, 2001). 
Kremp et al (1999) analyze a large panel of French and German firms and confirm the 
existence of a dynamic adjustment process stress the role of Husband System in 
Germany, and the impact of tax policy and the end of the so-called "indebtedness 
economy" in France. These findings are confirmed by De Miguel and Pindado (2001) 
who show that firms have a target leverage ratio in Spain, and that companies adjust to 
the target ratio relatively fast. 
 
3 Determinants of capital structure 
Prior research on capital structure by Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggests that the level of 
leverage in UK companies is positively related to size and tangibility, and negatively 
correlated with profitability and the level of growth opportunities. However, as argued by 
Harris and Raviv (1991), the interpretation of results must be tempered by an awareness 
of the difficulties involved in measuring both leverage and the explanatory variables of 
interest... 
In this section, we provide a review of the six main variables that have been used 
in previous studies examining the determinants of capital structure. 
 
3.1 Growth opportunities 
The empirical evidence regarding the relationship between leverage and growth 
opportunities is rather mixed. While Titman and Wessels (1988), Chung (1993) and 
Barclay et al. (1995) find a negative correlation, Kester (1986) does not find any support 
for the predicted negative relationship between growth opportunities and gearing. Despite 
this controversy, Rajan and Zingales (1995) uncover evidence of negative correlations 
between market-to-book and gearing for all G-7 countries. They suggest that, a priori, 
one would expect a negative relation between growth opportunities and the level of 
leverage. 
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This is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Jensen and Mekling (1976) 
based on agency theory, and the work of Myers (1977), who argues that, due to 
information asymmetries, companies with high gearing would have a tendency to pass up 
positive net present value investment opportunities (also known as growth options). 
Myers therefore argues that companies with large amounts of investment opportunities 
would tend to have low gearing ratios. 
 
3.2 Size 
Large size companies tend to be more diversified, and hence their cash flows are less 
volatile. Size may then be inversely related to the probability of bankruptcy (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Ferri and Jones (1979) suggest that large firms 
have easier access to the markets and can borrow at better conditions. For small firms, the 
conflicts between creditors and shareholders are more severe because the managers of 
such firms tend to be large shareholders and are better able to switch from one investment 
project to another (Grinblatt and Titman, 1998). 
Size can serve as an indicator of riskiness of the firm in that: 
• Smaller firms have higher product market risk, 
• Small firms have a higher probability to be takeover targets. 
• According to Whited (1992) small firms cannot access long-term debt 
markets since their growth opportunities exceed their assets. Titman and 
Wessels (1988) argue that larger firms have easier access to capital 
markets. 
Rajan and Zingales include size in their cross-sectional analysis. They say that: 
"The effect of size on equilibrium leverage is more ambiguous. Larger firms tend to be 
more diversified and fail less often, so size may be an inverse proxy for the probability of 
bankruptcy…" 
 
3.3 Profitability 
One of the main theoretical controversies concerns the relationship between leverage and 
profitability of the firm. Profitability is a measure of earning power of a firm. The earning 
power of a firm is the basic concern of its shareholders. 
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According to the pecking order theory, firms prefer using internal sources of 
financing first, then debt and finally external equity obtained by stock issues. 
The more profitable firms are, the more internal financing they will have. This 
relationship is one of the most systematic findings in the empirical literature. 
In a trade-off theory framework, an opposite conclusion is expected. When firms 
are profitable, they should prefer debt to benefit from the tax shield. In addition, if past 
profitability is a good proxy for future profitability, profitable firms can borrow more as 
the likelihood of paying back the loans is greater. 
 
3.4 Tangibility 
Previous empirical studies by Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and 
Fama and French (2000) argue that the ratio of fixed to total assets (tangibility) should be 
an important factor for leverage. The tangibility of assets represents the effect of the 
collateral value of assets of the firm's gearing level. 
Tangibility is defined as the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Harris and 
Raviv (1990) predicts that firm with higher liquidation value will have more debt. On the 
contrary, intangible assets such as good will can lose market value rapidly in the event of 
financial distress or bankruptcy. Firms with more tangible assets usually have a higher 
liquidation value. 
Tangible assets are likely to have an impact on the borrowing decisions of a firm 
because they are less subject to informational asymmetries and usually they have a 
greater value than intangible assets in case of bankruptcy. Additionally, the moral hazard 
risks are reduced when the firm offers tangible assets as collateral, because this 
constitutes a positive signal to the creditors who can request the selling of these assets in 
the case of default. As such, firms with a higher proportion of tangible assets are more 
likely to be in a mature industry thus less risky, which affords higher financial leverage. 
 
3.5 Non-debt tax shield 
Firms will exploit the tax deductibility of interest to reduce their tax bill. Therefore, firms 
with other tax shields, such as depreciation deductions, will have less need to exploit the 
debt tax shield. Ross (1985) argues that if a firm in this position issues excessive debt, it 
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may become "tax-exhausted" in the sense that it is unable to use all its potential tax 
shields. In other words, the incentive to use debt financing diminishes as non-debt tax 
shields increase. Accordingly, in the framework of the trade-off theory, one hypothesizes 
a negative relationship between leverage and non-debt tax shields. In fact, the empirical 
evidence is mixed. 
Shenoy and Koch (1996) find a negative relationship between leverage and non-
debt tax shield, while Gardner and Trcinka (1992) find a positive one. 
 
3.6 Operating risk 
Many authors have included a measure of risk as an explanatory variable of the debt level 
(Titman and Wessels, 1988; Kremp et al., 1999; Booth et al., 2001). 
Leverage increases the volatility of the net profit. Firms that have high operating 
risk can lower the volatility of the net profit by reducing the level of debt. By so doing, 
bankruptcy risk will decrease, and the probability of fully benefiting from the tax shield 
will increase. A negative relation between operating risk and leverage is also expected 
from a pecking order theory perspective: firms with high volatility of results try to 
accumulate cash during good years, to avoid under investment issues in the future. 
 
4 Sample selection and data description 
 
4.1 Sample selection 
Our sample consists of new high technology German firms listed on the Deutsche Boerse 
for the period 1996-2002. We use annual data extracted from http://deutsche-boerse.com. 
This website provides much information on many indices. It is owned by the 
private company that runs the Frankfurt Stock Exchange: the Deutsche Boerse AG. 
The data set includes a wide array of information on the companies including the 
annual Balance sheet, the Statement of income, the Statement of cash flow and the Profit 
and Loss Account. 
All data were hand-collected from 500 annual reports of the selected firms at 
http://deutsche-boerse.com. From these reports, we made extract information necessary 
for our analysis, such as operating income, total assets, net income, depreciation, tangible 
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assets, total equity, total debt...Then, we filled our data base on Excel. Finally, we 
imported our data on Eviews as a pooled data. This work was our starting point, it 
required much time and concentration. 
Some firms report annual financial statements in a summarized manner. For 
example, one firm reports its quarterly financial statements in March, in June, in 
September and in December, but it doesn't report an annual financial statement which 
includes figures the year. So, we were obliged to do some preliminary calculus to have 
the desired amounts of variables in an annual basis. 
Some other firms use the American dollar (USD) in their reports. So, we had to 
look for the average currency exchange rates observed during the considered quarter in 
order to convert the amount into (EUR). 
Our sample thus contains Biotechnology, Financial Services, Industrial & 
Industrial Services, Internet, IT Services, Media & Entertainment, Medtech & Health 
Care, Software, Technology and Telecommunication sectors. 
Table 1 shows the sample classification by sector and the percentage represented 
by each sector in the whole sample on 13/05/2003. 
 
Table 1 
 
From this sample only firms with at least four years of complete data and non-
missing observations on key variables were retained. We also exclude observations for 
which we have negative figures on the balance sheet. As a result, the final sample 
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consists of a pool of 99 firms. For these firms, the yearly data is from 1998-2002. This 
leaves us with a total of 467 observations. This panel character of our data allows us to 
use panel data methodology, simultaneously combining cross section and time series 
data. 
 
4.2 Description of the data 
After looking at the sample selection, we took great care to define the dependent and 
independent variables to be used in this analysis, in order that they were consistent with 
those of Rajan and Zingales (1995). However, whilst they define and calculate several 
alternative measures of leverage, their cross-sectional regression analysis is merely based 
upon one of these measures. 
Of these we use a book value measure of leverage (LEV) defined as the ratio of 
book value of debt to the sum of book values of debt and equity, as a dependent variable 
in our analysis. The evolution of the mean leverage ratio over the period of analysis, 
1998-2002, for global sample is presented in table 2. 
 
 
Table 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is interesting to compare our level of leverage with the results reported by Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) for their sample of G-7 countries. When leverages is defined as debt 
over capital, Rajan and Zingales (1995) report that U.S. and German firms have similar 
leverage around 38 percent. Interestingly, with this definition, our results deal with 
leverage ratios around 50 percent. 
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4.3 Explanatory variables 
As discussed above, our set of explanatory variables consists of those that have 
commonly been documented in the literature to affect firm leverage. We adopt six 
independent variables, defined as follows: 
• Growth opportunities (GROW): we use the percentage change in total 
assets from the previous to the current year as an empirical measure for 
the growth opportunities. 
• Size (SIZE): we use the logarithm of total assets to test the effect of firm 
size on the optimal debt level. 
• Profitability (PROF): we use the ratio of net income to total assets as a 
measure of profitability. 
• Tangibility (TANG): that is defined as the ratio of tangible assets to total 
assets. 
• Non-Debt Tax Shield (NDTS): we use total depreciation from the firm's 
profit and loss account divided by total assets as the empirical measure for 
non-debt tax shield. 
• Operating Risk (RISK): we use the squared difference between the firm's 
profitability and the cross section mean (across firms) of profitability for 
each year as a measure of the operating risk. 
 
Table 3 lists and defines the variables we will use in the study. These variables 
account for almost all major income statement, balance sheet and profit and loss account 
line items. All data were hand-collected from annual reports of the selected firms at 
http://deutsche-boerse.com. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 13
Table 3 
 
 
 
Bellow, we present in table 4 the main descriptive statistics of those measures of 
all the observations. Summary statistics include the mean, the minimum, the maximum, 
the standard deviation, the Skewness and the Kurtosis for the period 1998-2002. 
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Table 4 
 
In this descriptive table, we can see that profitability (PROF) and size (SIZE) 
have an asymmetric distribution to the left, while all the rest of proxy variables are 
asymmetric to the right. On the other hand, all variables show strong leptokurtosis. 
 
5 Model specifications 
Having discussed the variables that determine the optimal capital structure and variable 
that is used as measure of leverage in the previous section, we will now specify panel 
data models used in our study. 
    Modigliani and Miller (1958) say that leverage is a random variable. The static 
model tests this hypothesis, more specifically, the leverage is regressed on a set of 
explanatory variables, and if M-M holds, then these variables should not be significant 
from a statistical point of view. 
    We use explanatory variables to proxy for the determinants of capital structure 
as presented in the previous section. We posit that leverage can be explained as follow: 
Leverage = f (size, growth, profitability, tangibility, non-debt tax shield, risk) 
Let us consider the simple linear model in a static level: 
   (1) 
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Or, compactly 
       (2) 
where i = 1,…,N and t=1,…,T 
and  yit : leverage of firm i in year t 
xit : a vector of 6 time-varying regressors (x1it; x2it;…; x6it) assumed to be 
strictly uncorrelated with past, present and future realization of µit  
b' : a 6 x 1 vector of constants (b1; b2;…;b6) 
γi : individual effects or an unobserved heterogeneity 
µit : error term (µi1; µi2;…;µiT ) independently and identically distributed 
with zero mean and variance σµ2 
In the case where observations on yit and xit are available, an aggregate time series 
regression would treat γi as part of the constant and thus unidentified, whilst a cross-
section regression will yield a biased estimator of β  if γi is correlated with xit. 
For these purpose, we must identify whether the unobserved individual effects γi 
are random or fixed, that is, if these effects are orthogonal or not to the explanatory 
variables considered in the model. 
There are two basic frameworks used in this model. The fixed effects approach 
takes γi to be a group specific constant term in the regression model. The random effects 
approach specifies that γi is a group specific disturbance, similar to µit except that for each 
group, there is a single draw that enters the regression identically in each period. 
 
5.1 Fixed effects model  
Fixed effects model would have constant slopes but intercepts that differ 
according to the cross-sectional firms. It controls for the potential correlation between 
regressors and unobservable individual effects. The fixed effects approach takes γi to be a 
group specific constant term in the regression model. 
In general terms, we can write a static fixed effects model as: 
    (3)   
In the case of the presence of fixed effects,  β  and γi can be estimated consistently 
and efficiently by the Within Groups estimators (WG) which can be obtained by OLS 
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after the data are transformed by subtracting group means from each observation (Hsiao, 
1985). The idea is to transform equation (3) to eliminate γi, by first averaging over 
t=1,...,T.  
 
Then, 
        (4) 
Subtracting this equation from equation (3) to get: 
         (5) 
        (6) 
A natural way to estimate β is to apply pooled OLS to the transformed model 
(equation 6). The Within-groups transformation also eliminates any time-invariant 
variable (Hsiao, 1985). 
Because γi is treated as a fixed constant, the estimator of β is called the "Within-
Groups estimator" (βwg): 
     (7) 
The fixed effects estimators are given by: 
              (8)  
The one big advantage of the fixed effects model is that the error terms may be 
correlated with the individual effects. If group effects are uncorrelated with the group 
means of the regressors, it would probably be better to employ a more parsimonious 
parameterization of the panel model. 
 
5.2 Random effects model 
The random effects model is a regression with a random constant term; specific 
effect is viewed as an outcome of a random variable. 
In general terms, a static random effects model may be described as follow: 
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           (9) 
 
where µit are independently and identically distributed such that : 
 
The appropriate GLS estimator of β shows that the random effects estimator, 
given by βGLS, is consistent. 
     
6 Empirical analyses 
From panel data of 99 new high-tech German firms sample, covering the five years 
period 1998-2002, we have tested some hypothesis of theoretical capital structure. 
The panel character of our data allows us to use panel data methodology for 
testing our model discussed above, simultaneously combining cross section and time 
series data. Static Panel Models are classified into Fixed and Random models, depending 
on whether the individual effects are correlated with regressors or not. Each kind of 
model needs a different estimation technique in order to achieve efficient and consistent 
estimators. 
The static model is estimated by Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS), Pooled 
Ordinary Least Squares with Dummy Variables for year (POLSDV), Within Groups 
(WG) and General Least Square (GLS) estimators. To deal with the problem of 
heteroskedasticity, all coefficients are estimated using White-corrected standard error 
variance-covariance matrix. 
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Table 5 shows the POLS, POLSDV, WG and GLS estimation results for the static 
model. Our purpose is to base the analysis on the WG results, taking the POLS, POLSDV 
and GLS results as comparative references. The level of R-squared varies from 12% to 
72%. The R-squared are substantially higher when we use Within-Groups estimators 
(Fixed Effects model). 
Table 5 
 
As a modelling strategy we proceed as follow: 
    (1) Estimate Fixed Effects model and test for serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity (H0: No misspecification) 
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    (2) Under H0 (no serial correlation and homoskedasticity), select appropriate 
model by testing Random versus Fixed Effects 
    (3) Under H1 (serial correlation and heteroskedasticity): 
    - If T is small then estimate Fixed Effects with robust covariance estimators 
and test against pooled regression. 
    - If T is medium then estimate Fixed Effects after correcting for serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity. 
    - If T is large then consider Random Effects model. 
  A set of tests were undertaken on our models to verify the degree of consistency 
and robustness of the results obtained. 
The Breuch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity was carried out, whose associated 
static (LM=nR²) is asymptotically distributed as ² with q degrees of freedom under the 
null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. This test is based upon the use of OLS residuals 
regression and it leads us to accept the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity in the errors. 
Thus for the sample, there is homokedasticity at the 95% confidence level. 
Accepted way of testing is to specify a functional form for the persistence 
(correlation) in the residuals over time and test to see whether this specification is 
statistically valid. Usual test for this is to compute Durbin-Watson statistic. This test 
shows that there is no serial correlation. Then the error terms of the model are no 
correlated. 
To deal with the problem of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, we select an 
appropriate model by testing Random versus Fixed Effects models. To perform this 
comparison, the character of the individual effects is tested through the Hausman's 
specification test which is described above under: 
 
H0 : cov (γi,xit) = 0 
Our results for this test are reported in the following table: 
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Table 6 
 
This procedure indicates that the individual effects are supposed to be fixed. Thus 
the WG estimators (Fixed effects model) are more efficient relative to the GLS estimators 
(Random effects model) under H0, confirming our prior estimation (Table 5). 
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7 Findings and Conclusion 
Considering the results of the most powerful estimation (WG) as our reference, 
the empirical evidences obtained are stable and similar to those documented in the 
previous empirical researches. 
Size is positively related to leverage, indicating that size is a proxy for a low 
probability of default. Moreover, the estimated coefficients on SIZE are generally not 
significant. This is similar to the results in Rajan and Zingales (1995). 
Leverage is decreasing in risk (RISK) and profitability (PROF). Among all proxy 
variables, we find the strongest and most reliable relationship between these two 
determinants and leverage. 
Tangibility is almost always positively correlated with leverage. The regression 
coefficient on (TANG) is not significant in about all regressions. This supports the 
prediction of the trade-off theory that the debt-capacity increases with the proportion of 
tangible assets on the balance sheet. 
Growth opportunity is negatively correlated with Leverage. This indicates that 
specifically companies with high investment opportunities have significantly lower 
leverage than companies with low investment opportunities. This result is consistent with 
both the trade-off theory and the extended version of the pecking order theory. 
Finally, our proxies for the non-debt tax shield (NDTS) are generally 
insignificant. Only in one regression specification the estimated coefficient is significant, 
but the sign is opposite to what the trade-off theory suggests. 
But, this static approach, which normally estimates a simple cross-section 
regression of the ratio of observed debt on a set of explanatory variables, suffers two 
limitations. First, observed debt does not necessarily have to be identified with optimal 
debt, as this implies ignoring the difficulties companies suffer when adjusting their 
capital structure. Second, static empirical analysis is unable to explain the dynamic nature 
of company capital. 
One way to handle the problem posed by the static model is to estimate the 
dynamic panel data models. These models are very powerful tools that allow for 
empirical modeling of dynamics while accounting for individual level heterogeneity. 
Because dynamic panel models explicitly include variable to account for past behavior 
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and time invariant individual specific effects, they enable us to understand better what 
factors drive behavior over time, differentiating between true dynamics and factors that 
vary across, but not within, individuals over time. However, we must be careful when 
choosing from among the various dynamic panel estimators that are available. 
Our results are robust to several alternative estimation techniques, and while they 
depend on the exact definition of leverage, they are similar to what has been previously 
reported. 
In general term, both theoretical approaches, the pecking order and the trade off 
theories, appear to help explain the financial behavior of new high-tech German firms. 
However, given the nature of their activity, there is an implied suggestion that no ideal 
capital structure exists for these firms. 
Thus, from an empirical perspective, emphasis should be placed on constructing 
dynamic models that enable us to describe the financial behavior of new high-tech firms 
with discrimination between the various factors that impact on the target and those that 
impact on the speed of adjustment of these firms. Nonetheless, in so doing we raise 
several future avenues of research which may hopefully allow more concrete conclusions 
to be drown such as the more complete analysis of capital structure choice in new high-
tech firms, with the development of a new capital structure theory into an empirical 
model to describe the financial behavior of new high-tech firms. 
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